



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000800080013-2

Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505

Telephone: [redacted]
14 November 1978

OLC #78-3382

Publications

STAT TO: Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

STAT Attention: [redacted]

Dear John:

Enclosed are two publications
on the PRC. I believe you will
find them useful. Would you
please return them when you are
finished with them.

STAT [redacted]
Office of Legislative Counsel

FORM 1533 OBSOLETE
6-68 PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(40)

SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center

26 June 1978

CHINA: RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY

Introduction

For 40 years the lives of the Chinese people were almost totally bound up with the revolutionary vision of one man, Mao Tse-tung. Both the Chinese Communists' considerable successes during this period and their disastrous failures stemmed from his sometimes fanciful views and his stubborn will. Although Mao was able to transmute the Communists from a small band of hunted revolutionaries into a dynamic, aggressive totalitarian ruling elite, the domestic policies with which he was most closely identified in recent years often hindered the solution of problems and in many ways frustrated China's transformation into a modern industrial state.

During the last decade of his life, Mao's programs imposed severe strains on China's political system, causing serious dislocation in the economy and contributing to increasing cynicism and disillusionment among large segments of the population. During the Cultural Revolution, China was very nearly torn apart by a convulsion brought on largely by Mao's belief in the necessity of uninterrupted revolution as he strove to achieve his vision of a selfless, equalitarian and thoroughly communized China. Mao and his leftist associates clearly demonstrated that they

This memorandum was prepared by the East-Asia Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to a request from the National Security Council. Questions and comments may be addressed to [redacted]

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RPM 78-10266

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

9 November 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

AN OVERVIEW OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese foreign policy revolves around Peking's relations with Moscow. In the years since the communists took power in Peking in 1949, the Soviets have gone from friend to foe in Chinese eyes. China at first openly embraced the USSR as symbolized in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. But 22 years later, China's leaders welcomed President Nixon to Peking against the backdrop of a bitter feud with the Soviets. The fears of a growing, hostile China that were common in the west in the 1950s have now become the nightmare of the Soviets and their allies.

Behind this policy reversal lie three major concerns -- security, prosperity, and prestige. For the Chinese, these translate into the ability to offset the power of China's most immediately threatening enemies, the modernization of the Chinese economy, recognition of Peking as the sole government of China and, to a lesser extent, the cultivation of an ideological following.

This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia-Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to a request from the National Security Council. Questions and comments may be addressed to [redacted]

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